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We develop a general equilibrium two-country model with heterogeneous producers
and rent sharing at the ﬁrm level due to fairness preferences of workers. We identify
two sources of a multinational wage premium. On the one hand, there is a pure
composition eﬀect because multinational ﬁrms are more productive, make higher
proﬁts, and therefore pay higher wages. On the other hand, there is a ﬁrm-level wage
eﬀect: A multinational ﬁrm pays higher wages in its home market than an otherwise
identical national ﬁrm since it has higher global proﬁts. We analyse how these two
sources interact in determining the multinational wage premium in a setting with two
identical countries, and show that in this case the wage premium is fully explained by
ﬁrm characteristics. We then allow for technology diﬀerences between countries and
ﬁnd that a residual wage premium exists in the technologically backward country,
but not in the advanced country.
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11 Introduction
While the existence of a multinational wage premium is widely accepted as a stylised fact, the
determinants of this premium are far from clear. One prominent line of reasoning attributes
it to diﬀerences between multinational and national ﬁrms in terms of observable characteristics
like productivity, composition of the workforce, or capital intensity. There is strong empirical
evidence that such observable ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors are indeed important, but similarly that
these characteristics are far from explaining the whole premium (Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey,
1996). The unexplained residual can in fact be quite large, and a convincing explanation for
its existence is so far missing. One promising approach in the empirical literature has been
to consider country-speciﬁc factors along with ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics, and several studies
have found this approach to be successful in shrinking the unexplained part of the multinational
wage premium signiﬁcantly.1 In view of this empirical literature we propose in this paper a
theoretical framework in which ﬁrm-speciﬁc and country-speciﬁc factors interact in determining
the multinational wage premium.
We set up a general equilibrium two-country model, in which national and multinational
ﬁrms coexist. Firms are heterogeneous due to diﬀerences in their productivity levels (see Melitz,
2003) and countries can diﬀer in technology. There is rent sharing at the ﬁrm level due to
fair wage preferences of workers, and hence more productive ﬁrms pay higher wages because
they make higher proﬁts.2 Crucially, and relying on strong evidence from Budd, Konings, and
Slaughter (2005) and Martins and Yong (2010), we assume that rent sharing in each country
relates to a ﬁrm’s global – rather than national – proﬁts. There are two eﬀects that can in
principle lead to a multinational wage premium in our model. The ﬁrst is a pure composition
eﬀect: Setting up a foreign production facility involves ﬁxed costs, and hence only the most
1For instance, relying on empirical results for UK, Girma and G¨ org (2007) conclude that the nationality of the
foreign investor is an important determinant of the multinational wage premium, while Girma, Greenaway and
Wakelin (2001) show that the multinational wage premium in UK aﬃliates is more pronounced if the investor is
from the US than if the investor is from Japan.
2In this respect, our model contributes to a growing literature that looks at wage inequality in models of
heterogeneous ﬁrms (see Davis and Harrigan, 2007; Amiti and Davis, 2008; Egger and Kreickemeier, 2008; 2009;
2010; and Helpman, Itskhoki, and Redding, 2010).
2productive ﬁrms ﬁnd it proﬁtable to become multinational (see Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple,
2004). Due to this self-selection into foreign investment, multinational enterprises (MNEs) make
higher proﬁts than their national competitors, and they pay higher wages due to rent sharing
at the ﬁrm level. Therefore, in every country the average wage paid by MNEs is higher than
the average wage paid by national ﬁrms. The second eﬀect is a ﬁrm-level wage eﬀect: Since
rent sharing relates to a ﬁrm’s global proﬁts, MNEs pay higher wages in their home market
than an otherwise identical ﬁrm that does not choose MNE status. The ﬁrm-level wage eﬀect
interacts with the composition eﬀect, since it inﬂuences the decision to become multinational
and thereby the similarity of the pools of national and multinational ﬁrms with respect to their
average productivity.
In a ﬁrst step, we analyse the case of two symmetric countries and investigate how the two
sources of a multinational wage premium interact. We show that the ﬁrm-level wage eﬀect
in this setting magniﬁes the compositional eﬀect and further increases the multinational wage
premium. In addition, we show that a decline in the impediments to multinational activity makes
the populations of foreign multinationals and domestic ﬁrms more similar, and hence lowers the
multinational wage premium. Notably, in a setting with identical countries the multinational
wage premium disappears once we control for ﬁrm characteristics, or in other words there is no
residual wage premium: A domestic plant of a foreign MNE pays the same wage as a domestic
ﬁrm with the same productivity since in the symmetric equilibrium this ﬁrm necessarily is
multinational as well, with the same level of proﬁts as the foreign MNE.
In a second step, we extend our model by introducing country asymmetries in order to shed
light on the interaction between ﬁrm-speciﬁc and country-speciﬁc factors in determining the
multinational wage premium. We model country asymmetries in a stylised way by assuming
that ﬁrms in the “advanced” country draw their productivity from a distribution with a higher
expected value than those in the “backward” country, but countries are identical in all other
respects. As our most important result, we ﬁnd that in this case a residual MNE wage premium
exists in the backward country, but not in the advanced country. Intuitively, this is due to the
fact that the threshold productivity level necessary to become multinational is higher for MNEs
with headquarters in the backward economy – a ﬁnding that is consistent with the stylised
3fact that foreign investment ﬂows (on net) from more advanced to less advanced countries (see
Markusen, 2002; UNCTAD, 2009). Therefore, (only) in the backward economy there exists
a range of foreign multinationals and purely national ﬁrms with identical productivity levels.
These MNEs pay higher wages than their otherwise identical national competitors since they
have higher global proﬁts, which they share with their workforce in both countries. It is for this
reason that working for a foreign owned ﬁrm can be good for workers in backward countries,
ceteris paribus.
The country-speciﬁcity of the residual wage premium is well in line with the observation
that empirical support for a residual wage premium is strongest for developing, transition, and
newly industrialized economies (see Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey, 1996; Te Velde and Morrisey,
2003; Dobbelaere, 2004; Lipsey and Sj¨ oholm, 2004; Harrison and Scorse, 2009), while evidence
for the (most) advanced economies is less clear. For instance, Girma, Greenaway, and Wakelin
(2001) and Griﬃth and Simpson (2004) ﬁnd evidence for a multinational wage premium in UK
industries, after controlling for ﬁrm characteristics. On the other hand, relying on data for
Canada and Portugal, respectively, Globerman, Ries and Vertinsky (1994) and Almeida (2007)
show that the multinational wage premium vanishes in these countries when controlling for ﬁrm
and worker characteristics. Most starkly, Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey (1996) point out that
after controlling for ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors, an unexplained residuum of the multinational wage
premium can be found for Mexico and Venezuela but not for the US.
To the best of our knowledge, by giving a role to country-speciﬁc factors in general equi-
librium the theoretical framework developed in this paper is the ﬁrst to allow for the existence
of a residual multinational wage premium. There are however a small number of other studies
that oﬀer theoretical explanations for the multinational wage premium, all of them based on
particular features of MNEs that are not shared by purely national ﬁrms. Fosfuri, Motta and
Rønde (2001) and Glass and Saggi (2002) assume that MNEs use a superior technology to the
one used by their local competitors in the host country, and that workers hired by the MNEs
foreign aﬃliate acquire knowledge of this superior technology. In this setting, oﬀering a wage
premium can be optimal if it helps reducing job turnover and thus the risk of technology dissi-
pation. G¨ org, Strobl, and Walsh (2007) and Malchow-Møller, Markusen, and Schjerning (2007)
4set up a model with on-the-job training and assume that (on average) MNEs have access to
a more eﬀective training technology in order to explain a multinational wage premium in the
post-training period.3 These papers provide convincing arguments, complementary to ours, for
the empirical observation that MNEs pay higher wages to ex ante identical workers (at least in
later periods of their ﬁrm-speciﬁc tenure). However, once controlling for ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors the
wage premium vanishes in all of these settings, and hence the models are not well equipped to
explain the existence of a residual multinational wage premium.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and
solves for the autarky equilibrium. In Section 3 we describe our assumptions regarding the open
economy and analyse the decision of ﬁrms to become multinational. Section 4 solves for the
open economy equilibrium with symmetric countries and oﬀers ﬁrst insights into ﬁrm-speciﬁc
determinants of the multinational wage premium. Section 5 extends the model by introducing
asymmetries in the productivity distribution of countries. The last section concludes.
2 The Closed Economy
As a preliminary step, we introduce our modeling framework for the case where international
trade and multinational ﬁrms are absent. This section mainly serves the purpose to introduce
the notation and the key features of our framework in the most transparent way. The framework
combines elements of the heterogeneous ﬁrm models with ﬁrm-speciﬁc wage rates developed in
earlier work of ours (Egger and Kreickemeier, 2008, 2009). We therefore focus on deriving the
key relationships needed for the later analysis of the equilibrium with multinational ﬁrms, which
is the main contribution of the current paper.
We consider an economy with a single factor of production, labour L, that is used in the
production of diﬀerentiated intermediate goods v, which are sold under monopolistic compe-
3Scheve and Slaughter (2004) point to an additional rationale for why MNEs pay higher wages than their local
competitors. They argue that a multinational wage premium may compensate workers for the greater labour
market volatility associated with being employed in an MNE. However, they do neither present a full-ﬂedged
model for studying this eﬀect nor do they provide conclusive evidence that the risk of job loss is indeed higher
for workers in MNEs than for workers in other ﬁrms.
5tition. A second sector produces homogeneous good Y under perfect competition, using the








, 0 < ρ < 1, (1)
with the measure of set V representing the mass of available intermediate goods M.4 We take
ﬁnal output as the numeraire, and hence the CES price index P corresponding to the production
function in Eq. (1) is normalised to one. Proﬁt maximisation of ﬁnal goods producers results in





where σ ≡ 1/(1 − ρ) equals the constant elasticity of substitution between varieties.
Each intermediate goods producer operates a single domestic plant and has to bear a ﬁxed
beachhead cost f, in units of ﬁnal output, in order to run a distribution system for the ﬁrm-
speciﬁc variety of the good. Firms have constant ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity φ(v), as in Melitz
(2003). The marginal cost of ﬁrm v is given by c(v) = w(v)/[φ(v)ε(v)], with w(v)/ε(v) being
the wage per eﬃciency unit of labour, which is linked to the operating proﬁts of ﬁrm v by a
rent-sharing mechanism, as outlined below.
The proﬁt maximisation problem of ﬁrms appears to be more complicated than in the stan-
dard monopolistic competition model since ﬁrms have discretion over the wage they pay. How-
ever, due to the rent sharing mechanism wages at the ﬁrm level are linked to (and increasing in)
a ﬁrm’s operating proﬁts. Consider now a hypothetical equilibrium where the ﬁrm chooses the
proﬁt maximising level of output, treating parametrically the wage rate implied by the result-
ing level of proﬁts. The only way a ﬁrm could lower this wage rate (which of course it would
prefer, ceteris paribus) would be to reduce its proﬁts, and so there is no room for the ﬁrm to
exercise its monopsony power (see Amiti and Davis, 2008). Hence, facing (2), ﬁrms choose the





4Using technology (1) instead of the Ethier (1982) technology with external scale economies simpliﬁes our
analysis signiﬁcantly, without aﬀecting the main insights.
6Wage and eﬀort at the ﬁrm level are linked by a fair-wage eﬀort mechanism along the lines of
Akerlof and Yellen (1990). It is by assumption impossible to write binding contracts on eﬀort,
and hence the desired level of eﬀort has to be elicited from workers via a wage oﬀer. Workers
condition their eﬀort ε on the wage they are paid relative to the wage they consider to be fair,
ˆ w. If ﬁrms pay at least ˆ w, workers provide the normal level of eﬀort, which, for notational
simplicity, is set equal to one. Eﬀort decreases proportionally if the actual wage w falls short
of ˆ w. Formally, we have ε = min(w/ ˆ w,1). Due to w/ε = ˆ w ∀w ≤ ˆ w, proﬁt maximising ﬁrms
have no incentive to pay less than ˆ w, so that we can safely follow Akerlof and Yellen (1990) in
assuming that ﬁrms set wages at least as high as ˆ w, implying that workers in all ﬁrms supply the
maximum amount of labour eﬃciency units: ε = 1. Furthermore, with positive unemployment,
which is ensured under mild parameter restrictions (see Egger and Kreickemeier, 2010), each
ﬁrm can hire the proﬁt maximising number of workers if they set w = ˆ w, so this is what they
do in equilibrium.5
The wage considered to be fair by a worker depends on two factors: ﬁrst, the economic
success of the ﬁrm in which the worker is employed and, second, the income opportunities
outside the present job, represented by the average wage in the economy. We use operating
proﬁts as a measure of ﬁrm success, and with constant markup pricing they are a fraction 1/σ
of ﬁrm revenues r(v). The average wage is a fraction ρ of output per worker Y/L, due to a
combination of markup pricing and the fact that labour is only used as a variable input. We











where θ ∈ (0,1) measures the importance of the ﬁrm-internal component in a worker’s fairness
considerations, and hence can be interpreted as a rent-sharing parameter. Since all ﬁrms pay
the fair wage in equilibrium, it is immediate from (4) that ﬁrms with higher operating proﬁts
5Howitt (2002) and Bewley (2005) provide an extensive discussion of the empirical evidence that supports
the importance of fairness considerations for real world wage payments. Fehr and Falk (1999) have designed
a laboratory experiment in order to investigate the relevance of imperfect contracting for the fair wage eﬀort
mechanism. They show that the inability to write a binding contract on the workers’ eﬀort is indeed crucial for
this mechanism.
7pay higher wages as long as θ is strictly positive. With θ = 0 there would be no rent-sharing,
with all workers receiving the same wage.









with ξ ≡ (σ − 1)/[1 + θ(σ − 1)]. Hence, in the closed economy the relative wage paid by two
ﬁrms 1 and 2 can be expressed as a function of their relative productivity levels. As θξ <
1, wages increase less than proportionally with ﬁrm productivity, and hence more productive
ﬁrms have lower marginal cost. Using the fact that employment at the ﬁrm level l(v) is equal
to r(v)/[p(v)φ(v)], we furthermore ﬁnd that for each ﬁrm v the wage rate w(v) is directly
proportional to operating proﬁts per worker r(v)/[σl(v)]. Hence, our framework is compatible
with the empirical regularity of ﬁrm-speciﬁc wage rates that are increasing in ﬁrm proﬁtability,









Figure 1: Wage proﬁle in the closed economy
In complete analogy to Melitz (2003) in our model there is a cutoﬀ productivity φ∗ be-
8low which ﬁrms decide not to produce, implicitly deﬁned by the zero proﬁt condition π(φ∗) =
r(φ∗)/σ − f = 0. We follow the by now common approach and assume that ﬁrm productivities
follow a Pareto distribution with the cumulative distribution function G(φ) = 1 − (φ/¯ φ)−k and
parameters k and ¯ φ. As is standard in a Melitz-type model with Pareto distributed produc-
tivities, the cutoﬀ productivity φ∗ is proportional to the average productivity ˜ φ. The latter is
implicitly determined by π(˜ φ) = Π/M, implying that the proﬁt of the average ﬁrm equals the








In order to ensure that the productivity average has a ﬁnite positive value, we assume k > ξ.








Together, Eqs. (5) and (7) completely characterise the wage proﬁle across ﬁrms, which is depicted
in Figure 1. The endogenous cutoﬀ productivity φ∗ is linked to model parameters via the









where fe are initial entry costs to participate in the productivity lottery, and δ is the exogenous
probability of exit in each period, in which a ﬁrm is active (see Egger and Kreickemeier, 2009).
3 The Open Economy: Firm-Level Aspects
We now consider a world economy with two countries, 1 and 2, that have the same population
size L but may diﬀer in their productivity ﬂoors ¯ φi, i = 1,2.7 Market entry in both countries
6Noting that Y = Mr(˜ φ) holds by deﬁnition of ˜ φ, while Y = Mq(˜ φ) follows from (1), we obtain p(˜ φ) = 1.
Together with (3), this implies w(˜ φ) = ρ˜ φ. Accounting for (5) and (6), ﬁnally gives (7).
7One could as well allow for asymmetries in the population size of countries. But such endowment diﬀerences
do not have an eﬀect on the outcome of our analysis and hence we consider symmetry in this respect throughout
our analysis.
9follows the mechanism described in the previous section, but after observing the realisation
of their productivity draw, ﬁrms now have three options open to them: They can shut down
immediately, they can decide to open a production plant in their home country, incurring the
ﬁxed cost f, or they can decide to open two plants, one in their home country, and one in
the other country, incurring overall ﬁxed cost f + F. In this case, a ﬁrm becomes a horizontal
multinational (see Markusen, 1984; 2002) and hence serves domestic as well as foreign consumers
through local production. In order to facilitate our analysis, we exclude two other forms of
foreign market penetration. First, we assume that transportation of intermediate goods is
subject to prohibitvely high impediments and hence ignore trade as a possible alternative to
horizontal investment. This is in contrast to the ﬁnal goods sector, where trade is not subject
to any impediments. Second, we assume that it is not attractive for ﬁrms to become a vertical
multinational with headquarters in the home country and a single production facility in the
foreign economy – for instance due to excessive ﬁxed costs of doing so. As a consequence,
becoming a horizontal multinational enterprise (MNE in short) is the only (relevant) option for
a ﬁrm to serve foreign customers.
3.1 Determination of Wages at the Firm Level
Under openness, the fair wage is determined in analogy to the closed economy case: For each
plant, it is a weighted average of the ﬁrm’s operating proﬁts and the average wage income of
the country in which the plant is located. The crucial question that needs to be considered at
this stage is whether to use national or global ﬁrm proﬁts in the fair wage constraint. There
is evidence that rent sharing within multinational ﬁrms occurs at the global rather than the
national level: Budd, Konings and Slaughter (2005) ﬁnd evidence for the international dimension
of rent sharing using European data, and Martins and Yang (2010) ﬁnd similar evidence for a
wider set of 47 countries, including many countries from outside Europe. In our framework, this
evidence can be rationalised by modeling the fair wage as depending on the global operating
proﬁts of a multinational ﬁrm, which is what we do in the following.8
8Notably, the evidence on international rent sharing in Budd, Konings and Slaughter (2005) and Martins and
Yang (2010) pertains to global ﬁrm proﬁts per worker. This evidence is accommodated in our framework in the
10We henceforth focus on country 1 ﬁrms, but analogous expressions hold for country 2 ﬁrms.











































12 are the total revenues of a multinational ﬁrm based in country 1, from
both of its plants.9
There are two immediate consequences of the fair-wage speciﬁcations in (10). First, multi-
national ﬁrms with the same productivity level pay the same wage rate irrespective of their
headquarters location. Second, there is wage diﬀerentiation between the two plants of a single
multinational ﬁrm if per capita labour income ρY/L diﬀers in the two economies. In particular
the following result is immediate:
Lemma 1. Multinational ﬁrms pay lower wages in the market with the lower per capita income.
There is a second wage diﬀerential of interest, namely the one between the wage a multina-
tional ﬁrm pays its domestic workers and the wage that would be paid by a national ﬁrm with
the same productivity. This diﬀerential is important since it inﬂuences the decision of a ﬁrm



















sense that in equilibrium ﬁrms with higher wages have higher proﬁts per worker as well.
9Assuming that (operating) proﬁts of the domestic and foreign plant enter symmetrically in the fair-wage
considerations of workers is useful for presenting the main insights from our analysis in the simplest possible way,
but it is not essential for our results. In a richer framework with potentially more than one subsidiary per ﬁrm, a
higher weight of proﬁts speciﬁc to the plant in which the respective worker is employed could provide a rationale
for the empirical ﬁnding of Martins and Yong (2010) that a given level of total ﬁrm proﬁts has a weaker impact
on wages if these proﬁts are spread over more (foreign) plants.
11and hence the wage paid by a multinational ﬁrm in its domestic market relative to the wage
paid by an otherwise identical national ﬁrm increases ceteris paribus in the relative revenues
these ﬁrms make in the domestic market.
Using the demand function for intermediates together with the markup-pricing condition
gives a further relation between relative wages paid by national and multinational ﬁrms, and













Higher wages lead to higher marginal cost, ceteris paribus, which imply higher prices and lower











= [1 + Ω1]
−θξ , (14)
where Ω1 ≡ rm
12(φ)/rm
11(φ) is the ratio for a given multinational ﬁrm of the revenues in its foreign
and domestic markets. A multinational ﬁrm has to pay higher wages in its home market than
a national ﬁrm with the same productivity, and, as a result, it has lower revenues in its home
market.
The interpretation of Ω1 is helped by substituting for the respective revenues from the


















where Mti is the number of ﬁrms (including foreign multinationals) selling in market i. One can
see that relative revenues in the two markets do not depend on ﬁrm productivity, and hence
are the same for all multinationals of country 1. We will therefore interpret Ω1 henceforth as
a general measure of relative foreign market potential. We can summarise the main insights as
follows:
Lemma 2. When becoming multinational, a ﬁrm is faced with higher wages in its domestic mar-
ket, leading to lower domestic revenues. The size of this eﬀect is independent of the productivity
level of the ﬁrm.
12The relative foreign market potential as expressed in (15) has a straightforward interpreta-
tion. The ﬁrst term gives the ratio of average revenues per ﬁrm in the two markets, and it is
therefore a measure of relative market size. The second term is a measure of the relative com-
petitive position of the MNE in the two markets. To see this, note that the term is decreasing in
the relative price the multinational ﬁrm charges in its two markets, and this relative price can be
seen as a measure of relative competitiveness since the price indices in the two markets are equal
due to free trade in the ﬁnal good. For a given relative market size, the relative price is higher
in the market with higher income Yi, and this eﬀect is the larger the smaller θ and therefore
the larger the eﬀect of local labour market conditions on ﬁrm-speciﬁc wage rates. Speciﬁcally, a
higher income in the destination market 2 reduces relative foreign market potential Ω1 via the
relative competitiveness eﬀect, ceteris paribus, since it leads to a higher ﬁrm-speciﬁc wage in
country 2.
3.2 The Decision to Become Multinational
In Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), diﬀerences in labour productivity across ﬁrms in combi-
nation with ﬁxed foreign investment costs F lead to self selection of only the most productive
ﬁrms into multinational status. There is an additional cost of having MNE status in our model,
since – as we have just shown – with this status the domestic marginal costs of a ﬁrm increase.
We now analyse how this extra cost aﬀects the decision of ﬁrms to become multinational, deriv-
ing a condition for the “partitioning” of ﬁrms, with only the most productive ones self-selecting
into MNE status.
In an equilibrium with partitioning of ﬁrms by their MNE status, the productivity of the
marginal multinational ﬁrm φm











i.e. the marginal MNE with productivity φm
1 would make the same proﬁts as either a national



















1 ) = (φ∗
1/φm
1 )ξ, we can
rewrite the indiﬀerence condition in the following way:
[1 + Ω1]










Selection of only the best ﬁrms into multinational activitiy requires φ∗
1/φm








and this is guaranteed if F/f is suﬃciently large.10 In the subsequent analysis we focus on























Figure 2: Wage proﬁle across country 1 ﬁrms in the open economy
The wage paid by ﬁrms in country 1 as a function of their respective productivity is depicted
in Figure 2. Within each regime (m and n, respectively), the relative wage of any two ﬁrms is still
given by (5), and therefore wages are strictly increasing and concave in ﬁrm productivity within
regimes (see Figure 1). Furthermore, we know from (13) that being multinational increases the
wage a ﬁrm pays in its home market, ceteris paribus, and hence wm
11 lies strictly above wn
1 (the
dotted part of wn
1 gives the wage a ﬁrm with productivity φ > φm
1 would have to pay if it were
10For example, it is easily checked that in the case of identical countries (Ω = 1) self selection would occur in
the case where the ﬁxed costs are the same in both markets, i.e. F = f.
14a national ﬁrm). Lastly, it follows from (10) that the intra-ﬁrm wage diﬀerential wm
12/wm
11 is
determined by Y2/Y1: The multinational ﬁrm has to pay a higher wage in the market with the
higher labour income per capita in order to satisfy the fair wage constraint of the local workforce
(see Lemma 1). Figure 2 depicts the case where per capita labour income is higher in country
2.
4 The Open Economy with Symmetric Countries
We now turn to the analysis of the general equilibrium in the open economy. To this end, we
start by focussing on the case where countries 1 and 2 are identical in all respects, implying that
Ω1 = Ω2 = 1. The symmetry assumption allows us to neglect country indices in this section.
As analysed in Section 3, only ﬁrms with a productivity level higher than (or equal to)
φm ﬁnd it attractive to set up a second production facility in the foreign economy. Thus,
the ex ante probability that a successful entrant will become multinational is given by χ ≡
[1 − G(φm)]/[1 − G(φ∗)] = (φ∗/φm)k. Since ﬁrms know their productivity levels before they
decide upon their export status, χ also gives the ex post fraction of multinationals, and hence









The share of ﬁrms becoming multinational decreases with higher cost of MNE status, as would
be expected. Furthermore, with part of the ﬁrms being active in both countries, average proﬁts
per ﬁrm ¯ π = Π/M are larger than under autarky, and due to a standard selection eﬀect ` a la
Melitz (2003) the productivity cutoﬀ is higher in the open economy with multinational presence
than under autarky.11
We measure the multinational wage premium ω in a country, say country 1, as the ratio of two
average wages: One is the average wage of workers employed in country-1 plants of multinational
ﬁrms with headquarters in country 2 (foreign ﬁrms, denoted by superscript f), while the other
is the average wage of workers employed in country-1 plants of all ﬁrms with headquarters in
11Derivations are standard, and along with explicit solutions for macro-variables like aggregate income and
economy-wide employment they are available from the authors upon request.
15country 1 (home ﬁrms, denoted by superscript h). In general equilibrium, both averages – and
therefore ω – depend on the composition of the respective ﬁrm pools, as well as the relative
wages paid by national and multinational ﬁrms. Total wage payments and employment levels















respectively, where we make use of the fact that wage payments are a fraction ρ of revenues in all
ﬁrms. The resulting average wage is denoted by wf ≡ Wf/Lf. For home ﬁrms, the respective
variables are given by














respectively, and the resulting average wage is denoted by wh ≡ Wh/Lh. As shown in the


















It is easily checked that ω is equal to one if χ is equal to one, and larger than one otherwise.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd dω/dχ < 0, and hence the multinational wage premium decreases mono-
tonically in the share of ﬁrms that have MNE status. Using (18), we can furthermore relate ω
to model parameters: The multinational wage premium is lower the lower the ﬁxed cost F of
FDI.
The main results from this section can be summarised as follows:
Proposition 1. With symmetric countries and selection of the most productive ﬁrms into MNE
status there exists a multinational wage premium, i.e. ω > 1. The premium decreases monoton-
ically in the proportion of ﬁrms that have MNE status.
16Intuitively, the multinational wage premium in (19) exists simply due to the fact that the
pools of home and foreign ﬁrms diﬀer in their composition: foreign ﬁrms, which by deﬁnition
are all MNEs, are on average more productive than home ﬁrms. They make therefore higher
proﬁts, which via the rent-sharing mechanism lead to higher wages. The extent of self-selection
into multinational status, and hence the size of this compositional eﬀect, is inﬂuenced by the
ﬁrm level wage eﬀect identiﬁed earlier: ﬁrms of a given productivity have to pay a higher wage
if they choose to become multinationals since their global proﬁts are higher. With a higher χ
the pools of foreign and home ﬁrms become more similar, thereby weakening the compositional
eﬀect that is responsible for the existence of the multinational wage premium. For χ = 1 all
ﬁrms engage in FDI and the premium vanishes.
Evidence in support of our result that MNEs are on average more productive than their
domestic competitors, and also pay higher wages, is provided by Girma, Greenaway and Wake-
lin (2001). Furthermore, recollecting from Section 3.1 that multinational ﬁrms with the same
productivity level pay the same wage rate irrespective of their headquarters location, the results
in this section are also consistent with the observation in Heyman, Sj¨ oholm, and Tingvall (2007)
that foreign-owned ﬁrms tend to pay higher wages than domestically owned ﬁrms without for-
eign aﬃliates, but, on the other hand, they do not pay higher wages than domestically owned
multinationals.
5 Asymmetric Countries and the Multinational Wage Premium
The analysis in the previous section has shed light on the role of ﬁrm characteristics for ex-
plaining the MNE wage premium, and there is indeed strong evidence that diﬀerences in ﬁrm
characteristics can explain a substantial share of this premium (see G¨ org, Strobl, and Walsh,
2007). However, the empirical literature identiﬁes country-speciﬁc factors as an additional set
of relevant determinants of the MNE wage premium. For instance, Girma and G¨ org (2007) ﬁnd
that the wage payment of multinational ﬁrms crucially depends on the nationality of the foreign
investor. This suggests that the MNE wage premium is governed by the economic fundamentals
of the countries that are involved in the multinational activity. The role of these fundamentals
cannot be studied adequately in a setting with symmetric countries, and hence we have to in-
17troduce some form of asymmetry in our model in order to shed further light on this issue. One
possibility to capture country asymmetries is to assume diﬀerences in the technology distribu-
tion, and the simplest way to model this form of asymmetry is to assume diﬀerent productivity
ﬂoors, i.e. ¯ φ1  = ¯ φ2.12
We start our formal discussion by noting that the marginal ﬁrm’s revenue equals σf in both























must hold as long as the marginal ﬁrm in either economy is active in its domestic market only,
which we assume throughout (see (17)). Together with the constant markup pricing condition,
the fair wage constraint in (9) and the deﬁnition of Ω1 in (15), we can then derive a simple
relationship between the ratio of cutoﬀ productivity levels, φ∗
1/φ∗
2, and the relative foreign market









Eq. (21) establishes that the cutoﬀ productivity ratio is a monotonically increasing function
of the relative foreign market potential, with φ∗
1 being larger than φ∗
2 if and only if country
1 has the larger foreign market potential. Intuitively, an increase in the cutoﬀ productivity
ratio lowers, all other things equal, the variable production costs of the marginal producer in




2) > 1. Hence,
the relative foreign market potential of country 1, as measured by Ω1, must increase in order
to re-establish the condition that revenues of the marginal producers are the same in the two
economies (see (20)).
In the open economy, both the relative cutoﬀ levels and the relative market potential are
endogenous variables, of course. We now relate them to the exogenous diﬀerence in the countries’













12The distribution with the higher productivity ﬂoor ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the other one. See
Demidova (2008) for a more extensive discussion of technology diﬀerences between countries in a trade model
with heterogeneous ﬁrms.
18We cannot directly infer the nexus between relative productivity ﬂoors and relative cutoﬀ produc-
tivities from (22), as the share of country-i ﬁrms that are multinational, χi, is itself endogenous.








, i = 1,2. (23)
Acknowledging Ω2 = 1/Ω1, Eqs. (21) to (23) give a system of four equations in the four unknowns
φ∗
1/φ∗
2, Ω1, χ1, and χ2.













   ¯ φ1
¯ φ2
(22′)
where – from Eqs. (21) and (23) – the derivatives B′(φ∗
1/φ∗









 ¯ φ1/¯ φ2
 
C′( )B′( )
which is strictly positive if and only if (¯ φ1/¯ φ2)C′( )B′( ) < 1. It can be shown that this condition
holds in any equilibrium that leads to self-selection of the best ﬁrms into multinational status
in both countries: χ1 ∈ (0,1), χ2 ∈ (0,1), i.e. if (17) holds for both countries (see appendix).
Such an equilibrium exists if the diﬀerence in the productivity ﬂoors ¯ φ1 and ¯ φ2 is not too large
and the ﬁxed cost for additionally setting up a foreign production facility, F, is suﬃciently high.
Only in this case is the relationship between φ∗
1/φ∗
2 and ¯ φ1/¯ φ2 governed by (22). Since the
cutoﬀ productivities φ∗
i are equalised across countries if they have identical productivity ﬂoors
¯ φi, the previous analysis shows that the more advanced country (as measured by a higher ¯ φi)
has the higher cutoﬀ productivity φ∗
i and the higher share of ﬁrms that are multinational χi. It
furthermore shows that the more advanced country has the higher foreign market potential Ωi.
These results imply that the population of home ﬁrms diﬀers in its composition between the
two countries if ¯ φ1  = ¯ φ2, and that the same is true for the population of foreign ﬁrms. To say
something more speciﬁc, we combine Eqs. (21) and (23), and furthermore use the relationship
between χi and the multinational productivity cutoﬀ, which is analogous to the case of symmetric
19countries: χi = (φ∗
i/φm





















As shown in detail in the appendix, d(φm
1 /φm
2 )/dΩ1 < 0. Since, as shown above, Ω1 is increasing
in ¯ φ1/¯ φ2, the multinational productivity cutoﬀ is higher in the technologically backward country.
This means that it is more diﬃcult to survive as a foreign multinational in the technologically
advanced country, consistent with the stylised fact that foreign direct investment ﬂows (on net)














Figure 3: Residual wage premium in backward country 2
As an implication of the country-speciﬁc multinational cutoﬀs, in the technologically back-
ward economy there is a subgroup of domestic national ﬁrms and foreign multinationals which
have the same productivity levels. Hence, even if national and multinational ﬁrms use the same
technology, they diﬀer in their wage payments due to the wage premium that has to be paid by
the multinational, according to (13). In other words, there is a residual wage premium – i.e. a
premium that is not fully explained by ﬁrm characteristics – in the backward country. Figure
3 illustrates the residual wage premium, where country 2 is assumed to be the technologically
backward country. In the productivity interval (φm
1 ,φm
2 ) there exists an overlap between na-
tional country-2 ﬁrms with wage payments wn














Figure 4: No residual wage premium in advanced country 1
ﬁrms with wage payments wm
12(φ) > wn
2(φ). In contrast, no residual wage premium exists in the
technologically advanced country, since there is no overlap between the populations of domestic
national ﬁrms and foreign multinationals in terms of their productivity. This is illustrated in
Figure 4.
From the empirical literature on wage payments in MNEs, we know that evidence on the
existence of a residual wage premium varies signiﬁcantly across countries. To be more speciﬁc,
while the existence of such a residual premium in high-income countries is still under debate
(see Globerman, Ries and Vertinsky, 1994; Almeida, 2007), there is convincing evidence that the
respective residuum does exist and is sizable in developing, transition, and newly industrialised
countries (see Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey, 1996; Te Velde and Morrissey, 2003; Dobbelaere,
2004; Lipsey and Sj¨ oholm, 2004; Harrison and Scorse, 2009). This is well in line with our model,
which shows that the technology gap between the source and the host country of multinational
activity is not only a key determinant of the investment decision of ﬁrms but also gives rise to
a multinational wage premium in the technologically backward economy, which is not entirely
captured by diﬀerences in ﬁrm and worker characteristics. In summary, we have:
Proposition 2. The minimum productivity necessary to become an MNE is higher in the techno-
logically backward country. Controlling for ﬁrm characteristics, a residual MNE wage premium
21exists in the technologically backward country but not in the technologically advanced country.
The diﬀerence between countries in the composition of ﬁrm populations means that the size
of the multinational wage premium is now country-speciﬁc as well. As shown in the appendix,



























  , (25)
with ω2 determined analogously. The MNE wage premium for the case of symmetric countries,
as given by (19), is recovered as the special case with Ω1 = Ω2 = 1 and χ1 = χ2.
It is in general not clear whether the multinational wage premium is larger in the advanced
or the backward economy. We can, however, derive results for small (i.e. marginal) diﬀerences
between the two countries’ productivity ﬂoors (see the appendix). In particular, we ﬁnd the
following:
Proposition 3. For small technology diﬀerences, the advanced country has a higher multi-
national wage premium than the backward country if the share of multinationals in the two
economies is small, and vice versa if the respective shares are large.
As noted above, an increase in ¯ φ1/¯ φ2 raises the cutoﬀ productivity of foreign multinationals
(relative to domestic ones) and thus increases the average wage paid by these multinationals in
country 1 (relative to domestic multinationals in this economy). This eﬀect contributes to an
increase in ω1. At the same time, there are two counteracting eﬀects, as the least productive
national ﬁrms in country 1 stop production and leave the market, while more domestic ﬁrms
in country 1 ﬁnd it attractive to become a multinational and thus oﬀer a premium to their
local workforce. The strength of these counteracting eﬀects depends crucially on the share of
multinationals prior to the increase in ¯ φ1/¯ φ2: The existence of a ﬁrm-level wage eﬀect implies
that a ﬁrm shrinks in its domestic market if it starts serving foreign consumers as a multinational.
Hence, the relative size of purely national ﬁrms with low productivity, and their individual weight
in the determination of the average domestic wage is high if the share of multinational ﬁrms
is high. The compositional eﬀect at the lower bound of the productivity distribution of active
22ﬁrms therefore has a strong impact on the average domestic wage if χ1 is large. In this case, ω1
shrinks in ¯ φ1/¯ φ2, while the opposite is true if χ1 is small.
We round oﬀ the discussion in this section by contrasting our theoretical ﬁndings with the
empirical evidence in Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey (1996), which to the best of our knowledge
is the only paper that looks at multinational wage premia in a set of countries with diﬀering
technology characteristics. The countries considered in their study are Mexico, Venezuela, and
the US . The key ﬁnding of their analysis is that, once controlling for ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors, the
multinational wage premium vanishes in the US, while a residuum of signiﬁcant size remains in
Mexico and Venezuela. This ﬁnding is well in line with our theoretical ﬁndings in Proposition
2. At the same time, they document a higher multinational wage premium for Mexico and
Venezuela than for the US, which they explain by larger wage spillovers of foreign MNEs on
domestic ﬁrms in the more advanced economy. Proposition 3 oﬀers a diﬀerent explanation of
this empirical ﬁnding by Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey (1996) pointing to the role of diﬀerences
in the composition of national as well as multinational ﬁrm populations.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we develop an analytically tractable general equilibrium model with multinational
ﬁrms which allows us to think about the multinational wage premium in a systematic way.
There is rent sharing at the ﬁrm level due to fairness preferences of workers, and we focus on the
empirically relevant case that rent sharing within multinational ﬁrms occurs at the global rather
than national level. In our framework two sources of a multinational wage premium exist. On
the one hand, there is a pure composition eﬀect because multinational ﬁrms are more productive,
make higher proﬁts, and therefore pay higher wages than purely national ﬁrms. On the other
hand, there is a ﬁrm-level wage eﬀect of being a multinational: MNEs pay higher wages in their
home market than otherwise identical national ﬁrms since their global proﬁts are higher.
We ﬁrst analyse how these two sources interact in determining the multinational wage pre-
mium in a setting with two identical countries. We show that an MNE wage premium exists
in this case, and that it is increasing in the costs of FDI. It is also shown that with symmetric
countries the wage premium is fully explained by ﬁrm characteristics. Therefore, no scope for a
23residual wage premium exists in this case, and from a worker’s perspective working for a foreign
owned ﬁrm is not beneﬁcial as such. We then allow for technology diﬀerences between countries
and ﬁnd that a residual wage premium does exist in the technologically backward country, but
not in the advanced country. Hence, in our framework technologically backward countries are
an environment in which it may be beneﬁcial for individual workers to be employed by a foreign-
owned ﬁrm: national ﬁrms co-exist with foreign multinational ﬁrms of the same productivity,
and the wages paid by the latter are higher.
This paper provides novel insights into the interaction of ﬁrm-speciﬁc and country-speciﬁc
factors in determining the multinational wage premium, with the ﬁndings from this analysis
being well supported by empirical evidence. However, there are several directions in which this
research could and should be extended in order to get a more comprehensive picture about the
determinants of the multinational wage premium. On the one hand, by focussing exclusively
on technology diﬀerences between the two economies as the country-speciﬁc determinant of the
multinational wage premium, we abstract from other factors which may as well be important.
For instance, it is broadly accepted among economists that institutional diﬀerences between
Europe and the US are crucial for understanding the patterns of unemployment and wage
inequality on both sides of the Atlantic. Such institutional diﬀerences are not accounted for
in this paper in order to keep the analysis tractable. On the other hand, we do not account
for vertical aspects in the foreign investment decision of ﬁrms, and hence abstract from one
important form of multinational activity. Nor do we account for exporters, and thus exclude the
proximity-concentration trade-oﬀ in the ﬁrms’ decision upon the mode of foreign market entry.
While simultaneously allowing for both vertical and horizontal investment motives as well as
for exporting as an alternative mode of foreign market penetration would enrich our insights on
the multinational wage premium, such an extension is far beyond the scope of this paper and
therefore left for future research.
24Appendix
The Multinational Wage Premium with Symmetric Countries





























































k − (1 − θξ)
. (30)






























































Finally, accounting for (16) and (18) gives (19).
Derivation of Eq. (22)





















Accounting for (2), (5), (14) and rm
1 (φ) = rm
11(φ)+rm
12(φ) as well as rm
12(φ)/rm
11(φ) = Ω1, we can


























































Dividing the right-hand side of (36) by σ and substracting overall ﬁxed cost expenditures M1f +


















1) = σf and accounting for Π1 = M1¯ π1 gives average proﬁts ¯ π1 = (1 + χ1F/f) ¯ π1a.
Combining this zero cutoﬀ proﬁt condition with the standard free entry condition from Melitz
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The latter two equations establish (22).
Derivation of (22′) and the relationship between φ∗
1/φ∗







































Then, accounting for 1 − θξ = ξ/(σ − 1) and Eq. (23), we can rewrite (22) as (22′).
Diﬀerentiating C( ) with respect to φ∗
1/φ∗
2 gives






































where (¯ φ1/¯ φ2)−1 = C(φ∗
1/φ∗






, while χ2 < 1 implies f/F <
  
1 + B−1 ξ/(σ−1) − 1
 −1
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(f/F)(k−ξ)/ξ < (1 + B)
ξ/(σ−1) − 1,
  




1 + B−1 ξ/(σ−1) − 1.
Hence, we have
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B−1
1 + B−1 (42)
27or, equivalently,







This implies that χ1 < 1,χ2 < 1 are suﬃcient for (¯ φ1/¯ φ2)C′B′ < 1 as stated in the main text.
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(1 + 1/Ω1)1−θξ − 1
> 1,
(1 + Ω1)1−θξ
(1 + Ω1)1−θξ − 1
> 1 (46)
it follows that Φ′(Ω1) < 0. In view of (24), this further implies d(φm
1 /φm
2 )/dΩ1 < 0.
28Derivation of Eq. (25)
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Let us now turn to the employment levels in the respective groups of ﬁrms. Total employment










































where A1 is deﬁned as in (30), with ln
1(φ∗
1) instead of ln(φ∗). Total employment in local plants
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29Furthermore, dividing (49) by (51), gives the average wage paid by local plants of foreign
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which, accounting for (23), can be reformulated to (25).
Small technology diﬀerences and the size of ω1
Note ﬁrst that using (23) we can rewrite Eq. (25) in the following way
ω1 =
 
(1 + Ω1)1−θξ − 1




      
≡B1(Ω1)
1 + (1 + Ω1)
θξσ
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B2(Ω1)
. (55)
Since we know that the ﬁrst derivative of Ω1 with respect to ¯ φ1/¯ φ2 is positive, it is immediate that
the sign of dω1/dΩ1 × dΩ1/d(¯ φ1/¯ φ2) equals the sign of dω1/dΩ1. Hence, in order to determine
how small (marginal) technology diﬀerences aﬀect the size of ω1, we can diﬀerentiate the wage
premium in (55) with respect to Ω1 and evaluate the resulting expression at Ω1 = 1.
For this purpose, we ﬁrst diﬀerentiate B1(Ω1), B2(Ω1) and evaluate the resulting expression












































































































 k/ξ, and thus equals χ in (18). Putting together and
































































































































It is immediate that b1 > 0 if ˆ χ1 = 0, while b1 = 0 if ˆ χ1 = 1. Furthermore, b2 + 2b3 = 0 if
ˆ χ1 = 0, while b2 + 2b3 < 0 if ˆ χ1 = 1. This proves that dω1/dΩ1|Ω1=1 > 0 if ˆ χ1 is close to zero,
while dω1/dΩ1|Ω1=1 < 0 if ˆ χ1 is close to one.13
13From Eq. (18) we can deduce that ˆ χ1 = 0 if F/f goes to inﬁnity, while ˆ χ1 = 1 if F/f approaches 2
1−θξ − 1.
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